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The theses of meaning-variance and incommensurability of Kuhn and Feyerabend have
consequences which are not easy to digest: that it does not make sense to say that a later
scientific theory is more adequate, or is closer to the truth, than an earlier one, and that
there is therefore no genuine progress in science. Now it is widely agreed that there must
be something seriously wrong with this view, but there is no similar general agreement
on what would be the best cure.
The radical ideas of Kuhn and Feyerabend derive from their assumption of the contextual
theory of meaning. It is a version of the description theory or reference (or descriptivism,
in short), according to which the descriptions that speakers analytically associate with an
expression give the meaning of it, and determine its reference. As a consequence, Kuhn
and Feyerabend rejected the very possibility of an independently meaningful
observational language, a common ground from which the rival theories could be
compared, as well as the possibility of crucial experiments. Even the meanings of alleged
observational terms are, according to them, exhausted by their theoretical context.
It has sometimes been suggested that the so-called new theory of reference, or the causal
theory of reference,1 developed especially by Kripke (as a novel alternative to the more
traditional description theory of reference), would provide an alternative picture of
meaning and reference which avoids the unwelcome consequences of the meaning-
variance thesis. Roughly, the idea of the causal theory of reference is that an expression
refers to whatever is appropriately causally linked to the speaker. By cutting off the link
between reference of a term and the beliefs (or, the theory) associated with the term, it
allows the reference to stay stable even if the associated beliefs change. And the
1 A terminological note: I shall use “the causal theory” for the specific picture which was put forward by
Kripke as the correct account of the reference of most ordinary proper names, and perhaps of some general
terms (see below), and I shall call the more general picture of reference that emerges from the writings of
Kripke, Putnam, Schwartz, Devitt and others “the new theory of reference”. On this terminology, “the
causal theory of reference” is a proper part of “the new theory of reference” (as becomes clearer below).
2sameness of reference is sufficient for comparison between theories, even if the meaning
changes.
This proposal has been welcomed by some (e.g. Boyd 1973; Kitcher 1978; Newton-
Smith 1981; Hacking 1983; Devitt 1979, 1984/1999), but numerous philosophers of
science have been quite critical towards the causal theory of reference (e.g. Fine 1975;
Enc 1976; Mellor 1977; Papineau 1979; Nola 1980; Dupre 1981; Kroon 1987; Psillos
1999; Niiniluoto 1999; Bird 1998, 2000). Some favour instead “causal descriptivism”
(e.g. Bird, Psillos).
Objections to the New Theory of Reference
Let us next look at what are the most influential objections to the new theory of
reference, with a particular focus on the philosophy of science. To begin with, the
standard critical claim – especially among the philosophers of science – is that the new
theory of reference fails to account for reference failure. That is, it is proposed that the
new theory of reference cannot explain the cases, not absent in the history of science,
where one has ended up with the conclusion that certain postulated theoretical entities did
not exist after all. But certainly the scientists who first introduced the term were causally
interacting with something that caused the phenomenon which the entities were
postulated to explain. For example, it is now agreed that “phlogiston” failed to refer to
anything real. But there was something, namely oxygen, present in combustion.
Therefore, the argument continues, if the new theory of reference were true, “phlogiston”
should refer to oxygen rather than fail to refer (e.g. Enc 1976; Nola 1980; Kroon 1985;
Niiniluoto 1999, p. 126; Psillos 2000, p. 290; Bird 2000, p. 185).
Further, a usual objection for the new theory of reference, in the context of the
philosophy of science, is that ostension, or perceptual contact, important in the
introduction of a name as the new theory of reference describes it, is just not possible in
the case of theoretical entities of science – in other words, that theoretical entities are not
easily pointed to. Hence, it is concluded, the new theory of reference cannot explain the
reference of theoretical terms (see e.g. Bird 2000, p. 184)
Finally, Papineau (1979), Dupre (1981), and many others, have complained that a sample
will usually be a member of many kinds. So how can a general term be introduced? If it
happens via the initial baptism in the ostensive contact with a sample, as the causal theory
of reference seems to suggest, how can one rule out wrong kinds of generalizations? This
is the so-called qua-problem (see Devitt & Sterelny 1999, 72-75). For example, a
particular tiger is not only a sample of a tiger, but in addition, say, of a Siberian tiger, as
well as of a feline, a mammal etc.
3These seem to be the main objections to the new theory of reference among the
philosophers of science. I shall argue that many of them have an over-simplified and, in
part, mistaken understanding of what the new theory of reference, or the causal theory in
particular, amounts to. I shall briefly review the principal ideas of the causal theory, and
explain how the new theory of reference can account for reference failure, or for
reference to unobservable theoretical entities. I also argue that causal descriptivism is in
any case a non-starter.
A Closer Look at the New Theory of Reference
In order to evaluate how well the above critiques hit their target, it is necessary to take a
bit closer look at the causal theory of reference (the positive account is mainly due to
Kripke). The theory has two parts: a theory of introduction of referring expressions, and a
theory of subsequent reference transmission, or, ‘reference-borrowing’ (for simplicity, let
us first consider only proper names):
First, there is the initial introduction of a referring expression to the language, a baptism
or a dubbing event. There, an object must somehow be singled out for naming. According
to Kripke, this can happen either with the help of a description, or of an ostension (ie., by
pointing  to  it).  Moreover,  Kripke  even  adds:  “The  case  of  baptism  by  ostension  can
perhaps be subsumed under the description concept also. Thus the primary applicability
of the description theory is that of initial baptism.” (Kripke 1980, p. 96, fn 42). It must be
added, though, that in the case one is in direct perceptual contact with the object named,
an additional description used may not be satisfied by the referent.
Second, other speakers not present at the name-giving occasion acquire the word from
those in attendance at the baptism, still others from the former, and so on. Later users of
the name need not know or be able to identify the referent. They acquire the name from
earlier users of the name, and it is sufficient for successfully referring to the referent that
they are part of an “historical” or “causal” chain of speakers which goes back to the first
users. Speakers may be largely ignorant of this chain, and even from whom they got the
name. Nevertheless, they can successfully refer using the expression. This is the
phenomenon of reference borrowing.
In other words, any description used in the short-term to pick out the object to be named
need not retain any long-term association with the name. So long as the intention remains
to keep on referring to the same individual to which one has been referring, the
description may be forgotten or misremembered. But Kripke’s main point is that no
uniquely identifying description need be or generally is transmitted along with a name
(cf. Burgess 2006).
4Interim Conclusions
Two important points deserve emphasizing here: First, it is of crucial importance to note
that the causal relation, if it is mentioned at all (for many of those advocating the new
theory of reference rather prefer to talk about an “historical chain”), is said to hold
between earlier and later users of the name (and even then, Kripke often puts “causal”
inside quote marks). The thesis is emphatically not that there has to be a causal
connection between the object referred to and a speaker, much less that an expression
refers to whatever is causally responsible for the uses of the expression, or to whatever
with which the introducers of the expression were causally interacting when it was first
introduced.
Therefore, when philosophers of science make claims such as “the causal theory was
supposed to identify the reference of a term with the cause of our use of the term” (Bird
2000, p. 185), or that “the causal theorists insist that what fixes the reference of a term …
is the causal chain which connects the term with the object named in the dubbing
ceremony” (Psillos 1999, p. 282), they are simply misrepresenting the essential idea of
the causal theory of reference. Thus, it begins seriously to look like the “causal theory of
reference” of many philosophers of science is in actuality a straw man, a caricature of the
real theory. Consequently, it is also not as clear as many have thought that it is in trouble
with reference failure (see also below).
Second, in the initial introduction of a term, it is clearly allowed by Kripke, and all those
who follow him, that a description is used to single out the referent. If the description
then fails, one may fail to name anything from the outset, and the resulting name is
empty. For Kripke, anything that can be described can be named. The description need
not involve ostension (though it may). Thus, according to Kripke, even numbers and
other abstract entities can well be named, with the help of descriptions. Neither
perceptual contact nor any causal connection is necessarily required, in order for one to
be able to introduce a referring name. To repeat, the “causal” chain then occurs between
the first and later users of the name.
The Scope of the Causal Theory
It is also important to recognize that the causal account was never proposed as a universal
theory of referring expressions without exceptions, but primarily as a theory of ordinary
proper names and observational, or manifest, natural kind terms such as “water”, “gold”,
or “tiger”.2 It has been allowed from the beginning that some expressions, even some
2  Devitt (1981), for example, explicitly talks about “observational natural kinds” here. More recently,
many philosophers of language have started to call such kinds “manifest natural kinds” (e.g. Soames).
I shall use, in the present context, “observational”, in accordance with the terminology in the philosophy of
science.
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Kripke suggested that, for example, “Jack the Ripper” may be taken to refer to the man,
whoever committed all these murders, or most of them (Kripke 1980, p. 79). He only
adds: “But in many or most cases, I think the thesis [descriptivism] is false” (ibid, p. 80)
Putnam in turn allows that there are – in addition to observational natural kind terms,
which (with proper names) function along the lines that the causal theory suggests – also
law-cluster terms3 and even what Putnam calls one-criterion terms; the meaning of the
latter can indeed be given by a simple definition; for example “vixen” means the same as
“female fox”. Such words are, though, quite rare according to Putnam.
Devitt (1981) in turn introduces, generalizing Donnellan’s distinction, a systematic
terminology for this same issue and talks about attributive and designational names. In
this terminology, most ordinary names, like “Aristotle”, are designational (or referential)
– but “Jack the Ripper”, for example, is attributive. The same distinction obviously
applies to general terms.
More on Reference Failure and Theoretical Terms
Let us now reconsider the issue of empty names, or reference failure – the cases such as
“phlogiston”. To begin with, it was already pointed out above that the causal account of
reference has been put forward first and foremost as a theory of ordinary proper names
and observational natural kind terms. However, “phlogiston” for example simply is not
such an observational natural kind term; it was not introduced in a perceptual contact
with  a  sample  of  the  substance.  An  advocate  of  the  new theory  of  reference  may  well
submit that it is rather an attributive term, perhaps even comes close to what Putnam calls
one-criterion term, the meaning of which is given (roughly) by the definition “the
substance emitted in combustion”.
We may compare “phlogiston” (and such) to Kripke’s example of “Jack the Ripper”,
which, according to even Kripke, can be taken to mean, roughly, the same as the
description, “the man, whoever committed all these murders, or most of them” (Kripke
1980, p. 79). If it, however, turned out that each one of those murders was in fact
committed by a different person or that there were no murders at all, but that these were
all improbable accidents, one could conclude that ‘Jack the Ripper’ did not exist.
Similarly, a proponent of the new theory of reference need not assume that phlogiston
exists after all; the new theory of reference can well be accommodated to reference
failures.
3  Though Putnam later changed his mind and concluded the the law-cluster picture gives a wrong account
of observational natural kind terms, he never gave up the idea itself, and has continued to hold that this
would be an appropriate account of some scientific terms. (see e.g. Putnam 1986, 1988)
6Now what about the introduction of theoretical terms in general? We have already seen
that the new theory of reference just does not demand that the introduction of a name
must involve ostension, or perception – a pure description is sufficient. Hence, there is no
real problem in introducing a theoretical term, no more than there was with introducing
“Jack the Ripper”, from the point of view of the new theory of reference.
Causal Descriptivism
As was mentioned above, some philosophers of science prefer a new version of the
description theory of reference, known as “causal descriptivism”, to the new theory of
reference. This is typically motivated by the qua-problem. That is, it has been repeatedly
suggested that in order to avoid the wrong sort of generalizations, a pure causal theory
needs supplementation by a descriptive element, and that in turn leads us to causal
descriptivism (see e.g. Sankey 1994; Psillos 1999; Bird 2000). Thus, one can read, for
example: “On account of these difficulties the view has become widespread that the
causal theory needs supplementation by a descriptive element, what we may call ‘causal
descriptivism’” (Bird 2000, p. 185). However, apparently several distinct issues get
conflated here.
To begin with, there is the possible descriptive element in the first introduction of a term.
Now it has always been allowed by the advocates of the new theory of reference that
there are descriptive elements in the determination of a name’s reference. The
fundamental point of the new theory of reference is that such a descriptive element
associated with a name is often insufficient alone for uniquely identifying the referent, or
extension. This much was granted very clearly for example already in the standard
textbook exposition of the new theory of reference by Devitt and Sterelny (1987), and as
at least Sankey openly grants, “[a]rguably, this [descriptive elements] is already a feature
of Putnam’s original account” (Sankey 1994, p. 71) (Moreover, although Kripke did not
explicitly consider exactly this issue, there is no reason to think that he would have
objected; after all, he even allowed the introduction of a term to be purely descriptive.) In
particular, it has been long admitted that – in order to rule out wrong kinds of
generalizations, i.e., the qua-problem – there must be descriptive elements in use in the
introduction of an expression.
Thus Devitt and Sterelny concede: “the introducer of a name must use some general
categorical term such as ‘animal’ or ‘material object’ ((Devitt & Sterelny 1987, p. 65);
and: “It seems that our causal theory of names cannot be a ‘pure-causal theory’. It must
be a ‘descriptive-causal’ theory” (Devitt & Sterelny, ibid.) (note, however, that such a
‘pure-causal theory’ has in reality been nobody’s theory; that is, no key advocate of the
new theory of reference has ever held such a view). Sankey (1994) agrees with Devitt and
Sterelny, but unfortunately calls the resulting view quite misleadingly “a form of causal
7descriptivism”. This may have caused confusion, for what one usually means by “causal
descriptivism” is something quite different. Psillos and Bird, for example, seem rather to
assume – at least in some points – that it is the standard interpretation of Causal
Descriptivism, deriving from Lewis (1984) and Kroon (1987), which is assumed here.
In any case, allowing such a descriptive element does not amount to a return to the
description theory of reference – not by a far cry. Accordingly, Devitt and Sterelny write:
“Clearly, we have moved some distance back toward the description theories rejected
earlier… However, the extent of the move should not be exaggerated. First, the
association of a general categorical term certainly does not amount to identifying
knowledge of the object. Second, our movement is a modification of the causal theory of
grounding [i.e. name introduction]. The causal theory of reference borrowing remains
unchanged; borrowers do not have to associate the correct categorical term” (Devitt &
Sterelny 1987, p. 65).
As already noted, the descriptive element (a categorical term) at issue here is certainly
not what “causal descriptivism” suggests. So what really then is causal descriptivism?
One  may  express  the  basic  idea  of  causal  descriptivism,  as  it  is  usually  understood,
schematically, as follows:
Speakers associate a name “N” with a description of the form
(CD)         The entity standing in relation R to my current use of the name “N”,
and this description determines the reference of “N”. The relation R here is drawn from
the rival non-descriptivist (e.g. causal) theory of reference.
One may now note that if the causal theory of reference really were refuted by the alleged
problems mentioned above, the same problems would rebut causal descriptivism as well.
They stand or fall together. For example, if the empty names like “phlogiston” really
were a devastating counter-example for the causal theory of reference, they would be just
as much that for causal descriptivism, which builds the causal theory of reference in its
descriptions. Similarly, causal descriptivism does not itself help in any way with the qua-
problem. Further, causal descriptivism has various problems of its own (see e.g. Devitt &
Sterelny 1999, p. 61; Raatikainen 2006).
There is a third theme which also seems to loom behind these debates and sometimes gets
conflated with either the causal theory or causal descriptivism (and sometimes with the
possible descriptive elements in name introduction). Namely, the causal theory of
reference, or causal descriptivism (which mimics it), should not be confused with
Putnam’s idea of “causal descriptions” (e.g. Putnam 1973, p. 200). That is, Putnam has
suggested that some terms, perhaps “electricity”, for example, are first introduced with
causal descriptions such as: “By x I mean the magnitude that is responsible for such and
8such effects” or “By y let us mean the objects which are responsible for these and these
observable phenomena” etc. In passing, Kripke made a somewhat similar suggestion, that
perhaps “Neptune”, for example, was first introduced with the help of a causal
description like “the planet which causes such and such discrepancies in the orbits of
such and such other planets” (see Kripke 1980, p. 79, fn 33).
Such causal descriptions were, for Kripke and Putnam, but one of the many possible
ways in which a new expression could be introduced and nothing more. The idea was not
put  forward  even  as  the  only  possible  way  that  a  new theoretical term could be
introduced. Other sorts of descriptions are certainly admissible. Thus Putnam writes: “I
do not claim that a physical magnitude term can only be introduced by a causal
description. But I do claim that a customary way of introducing a physical magnitude
term is via a causal description…” (Putnam 1974, p. 176). It is an idea which is
independent of the main point of the causal theory of reference, where the “causal”
relation holds between different users of the term, and it is important to keep these two
different ideas separated. And again, such an idea of causal descriptions is totally
different from causal descriptivism.
Conclusions
It seems that most of the criticism of the new theory of reference in the philosophy of
science is really directed towards a caricature of the theory. Not a single one of the key
advocates of the new theory of reference have held such a view. Perhaps the causal
theory of reference does not generalize as widely as some may have hoped. But in any
case, it nevertheless opens interesting new possibilities in the theory of reference when
compared to the more traditional descriptivist options.
One should, after all, remember what was our initial problem. Namely, according to
Kuhn and Feyerabend, all expressions are theory-dependent to the extent that their
meaning is exhausted by their theoretical context, and consequently, that there is no
neutral observation language where the comparison of the rival theories is possible. Now
it is sufficient for the comparison that some expressions function in another way.
Therefore, if the causal account is adequate even for some terms, such as observational
natural kind terms, this is sufficient to undermine the meaning-variance thesis, and the
incommensurability thesis. The causal theory of reference, when correctly understood,
can thus be an important ingredient in the realist toolkit for defending the rationality of
science.4
4  This paper was presented in EPSA’07 in Madrid, which explains its compressed character. It is based on
a much more extensive paper in progress.
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